Is Gernot Rohr Done with Rebuilding and Now Consolidating?
Nigeria's manager, Gernot Rohr, repeatedly informed the world that his team was one of the youngest, on average, at the 2018 World Cup. He touted that perspective before, at, and then after the World Cup. Rohr used it to suggest a reason why his team did not go beyond the group phase in Russia. But the reality is that Nigerians have previously experienced better and such an excuse should be taken with a dose of doubt. Gernot Rohr may not have gone past the Group phase at the World Cup but such an excuse will find him packing his bag out of Nigeria if the team fails to qualify for the 2019 African Cup of Nations in Cameroon.
Thus, instead of touting a perspective that leans on rebuilding, he has to demonstrate that his team is now beyond that or that it, at least, is transitioning to the consolidation phase in building a strong Nigerian team capable of becoming African champion again. Consolidation does not mean absence of new players but it does require a team playing with experience, confidence and a sense of urgency. That can be observed in two key areas: personnel and team strategy.
Team Personnel
Notably, team personnel has taken at least one major hit. Gernot Rohr has not received any favors from Victor Moses who chose to retire at his prime.Victor Moses was not an ordinary player on the Nigerian team. In fact, he had been for a while, the heart and soul of the team. It was on his shoulders that Nigeria became African champion in 2013 when his singular effort railroaded an obstinate Ethiopian team in a crucial group game that opened the road to the quarter finals. In the qualifiers for the 2018 World Cup, Victor Moses was again the driving force as the team qualified with a game to spare. That Moses would retire from international duty right after the World Cup is a huge blow.
Team Personnel
Notably, team personnel has taken at least one major hit. Gernot Rohr has not received any favors from Victor Moses who chose to retire at his prime.Victor Moses was not an ordinary player on the Nigerian team. In fact, he had been for a while, the heart and soul of the team. It was on his shoulders that Nigeria became African champion in 2013 when his singular effort railroaded an obstinate Ethiopian team in a crucial group game that opened the road to the quarter finals. In the qualifiers for the 2018 World Cup, Victor Moses was again the driving force as the team qualified with a game to spare. That Moses would retire from international duty right after the World Cup is a huge blow.
But without Victor Moses and without the recuperating skipper Mikel Obi, there still should be no excuses for Rohr. He has now been on this job for 21 games and three years (2016, 2017, and 2018). This is the time to have a settled team, a team ready to win, and a team that should lean on its experience. That experience can be found among the on-field leaders of the team including at central defense, Wilfred Ndidi in the middle, and out wide with both Musa and Simon Moses. Even goalkeeper Francis Uzoho has now amassed reasonable experience at the World Cup and in the games leading to it (See Table 1 for data on team experience among the often used players in bold).
That Gernot Rohr continues to look for a reliable striker, three years into his appointment as national manager, is all on him. His decision to stick with Odion Ighalo since he was appointed manager cannot be blamed on a lack of talented Nigerian footballers. There are several Nigerian players who have delivered goals at the club level and they were available to be called up by the manager.
Three years on, Nigeria continues to search for a pure play maker in the middle. That cannot be blamed on a lack of talent in a country where players of all abilities emerge regularly. If Rohr cannot find a reliable player at that position that is also on him and no one else.
Three years on, Nigeria continues to search for a pure play maker in the middle. That cannot be blamed on a lack of talent in a country where players of all abilities emerge regularly. If Rohr cannot find a reliable player at that position that is also on him and no one else.
However, the suggestion that Nigeria should change its team based on the performance of Nigerian players in Europe is a recipe for disaster. That simply assumes an unending phase of team rebuilding based on the concept of a pick up game. Historically, performance at a club in Europe does not assure similar performance at the national team level because of several factors that include different tactics, variation in player confidence, relationship with others in a different team, and much more. Players are not robots, they are subject to human vagaries.
Moreover and as is, national team training days are severely limited by FIFA rules and yet managers must find the time in such scarcity of training time to install tactics. To now do so by introducing new faces each time a player or players do well in Europe will be ridiculous.
Nigeria should now be moving into a consolidation phase of team building which requires stability in team personnel with introduction of significant new contributors on rare and absolutely needed occasions. That should be the way to build on team strength and chemistry rather than to rebuild and rebuild eternally.
The bottom line is that the excuses of rebuilding are no longer compelling. Rohr has to deliver in these two important games coming up against Libya within the next week. Any misstep definitely condemns Gernot Rohr to service elsewhere beyond the borders of Nigeria. These two games are indeed the major tests for Rohr. If he passes, he stays but if he fails, he packs his bags. Those are the likely outcomes.
Team Strategy
Gernot Rohr is conservative at the core and his coaching in Africa has largely depended on a vision of building a stealthy team that soaks up pressure and attacks quickly to surprise the opponent. This was his usual game plan as manager in Burkina Faso, Niger Republic, and in Gabon. It made sense then because those teams were usually underdogs against the giants in the continent. But does it make sense for Nigeria? Many would say no. However, Rohr used it to huge effects during the World Cup qualifiers against Cameroon. His preferred formation in this approach is usually a 4-5-0-1 (The zero added to stress the gap between the most advanced player and the rest) in ball recovery mode but a 4-4-1-1 or 4-2-3-1 with the ball. In this piece, I focus solely on base formations and do not go into specific tactics as those vary based on opponent tendencies.
Rohr's insistence in playing in the formations described above collapsed like a pack of cards when he met favored teams in the international friendlies before the World Cup. In the opening half in a friendly against England, Nigeria looked pedestrian. The change to three at the back and adding additional personnel in the middle (3-5-2 and/or 3-5-1-1 attacking and 5-3-1 defending) in the second half of that game created an entirely different result. Suddenly, Nigeria competed. Yet, it isn't a formation that Rohr favors.
The data in Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate outcomes from the use of a three-man and the four-man defense. Overall, Rohr has managed 21 games played by Nigeria but the game v Togo is not included in this dataset because the defensive formation was not witnessed. We calculate the use of 4-man defense in a total of 16 games including the opening half of the England (1-2) game. For the 3-man defense, we calculate 5 games including the same England game but in the second half. Importantly, the use of three in the defense has been against theoretically stronger teams but results have been better. The total games then is a theoretical 21 games because a game (v England) is calculated two times.
Comparing the use of the two defensive formations present a problem because it is clear that the three-man defense has been used in much tougher games with four out of five against higher ranked opponents! Yet, its outcomes have largely been better than outcomes using a four-man defense. It presents the flexibility of having five players defend deeply and two advanced forwards when with the ball. With that formation, Nigeria has scored every 50 minutes compared to every 60 minutes in a four-man defense with a lone advanced forward. Unfortunately, this strategy with better outcome has not been used by Rohr against African opposition.
Against Libya, we shall see whether Rohr's tendency to stick with his four-man defense continues.
Moreover and as is, national team training days are severely limited by FIFA rules and yet managers must find the time in such scarcity of training time to install tactics. To now do so by introducing new faces each time a player or players do well in Europe will be ridiculous.
Nigeria should now be moving into a consolidation phase of team building which requires stability in team personnel with introduction of significant new contributors on rare and absolutely needed occasions. That should be the way to build on team strength and chemistry rather than to rebuild and rebuild eternally.
The bottom line is that the excuses of rebuilding are no longer compelling. Rohr has to deliver in these two important games coming up against Libya within the next week. Any misstep definitely condemns Gernot Rohr to service elsewhere beyond the borders of Nigeria. These two games are indeed the major tests for Rohr. If he passes, he stays but if he fails, he packs his bags. Those are the likely outcomes.
Team Strategy
Gernot Rohr is conservative at the core and his coaching in Africa has largely depended on a vision of building a stealthy team that soaks up pressure and attacks quickly to surprise the opponent. This was his usual game plan as manager in Burkina Faso, Niger Republic, and in Gabon. It made sense then because those teams were usually underdogs against the giants in the continent. But does it make sense for Nigeria? Many would say no. However, Rohr used it to huge effects during the World Cup qualifiers against Cameroon. His preferred formation in this approach is usually a 4-5-0-1 (The zero added to stress the gap between the most advanced player and the rest) in ball recovery mode but a 4-4-1-1 or 4-2-3-1 with the ball. In this piece, I focus solely on base formations and do not go into specific tactics as those vary based on opponent tendencies.
Rohr's insistence in playing in the formations described above collapsed like a pack of cards when he met favored teams in the international friendlies before the World Cup. In the opening half in a friendly against England, Nigeria looked pedestrian. The change to three at the back and adding additional personnel in the middle (3-5-2 and/or 3-5-1-1 attacking and 5-3-1 defending) in the second half of that game created an entirely different result. Suddenly, Nigeria competed. Yet, it isn't a formation that Rohr favors.
The data in Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate outcomes from the use of a three-man and the four-man defense. Overall, Rohr has managed 21 games played by Nigeria but the game v Togo is not included in this dataset because the defensive formation was not witnessed. We calculate the use of 4-man defense in a total of 16 games including the opening half of the England (1-2) game. For the 3-man defense, we calculate 5 games including the same England game but in the second half. Importantly, the use of three in the defense has been against theoretically stronger teams but results have been better. The total games then is a theoretical 21 games because a game (v England) is calculated two times.
Comparing the use of the two defensive formations present a problem because it is clear that the three-man defense has been used in much tougher games with four out of five against higher ranked opponents! Yet, its outcomes have largely been better than outcomes using a four-man defense. It presents the flexibility of having five players defend deeply and two advanced forwards when with the ball. With that formation, Nigeria has scored every 50 minutes compared to every 60 minutes in a four-man defense with a lone advanced forward. Unfortunately, this strategy with better outcome has not been used by Rohr against African opposition.
Against Libya, we shall see whether Rohr's tendency to stick with his four-man defense continues.
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